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Abstract—Host logs, in particular, Windows Event Logs, are
a valuable source of information often collected by security
operation centers (SOCs). The semi-structured nature of host
logs inhibits automated analytics, and while manual analysis is
common, the sheer volume makes manual inspection of all logs
impossible. Although many powerful algorithms for analyzing
time-series and sequential data exist, utilization of such algo-
rithms for most cyber security applications is either infeasible or
requires tailored, research-intensive preparations. In particular,
basic mathematic and algorithmic developments for providing
a generalized, meaningful similarity metric on system logs is
needed to bridge the gap between many existing sequential data
mining methods and this currently available but under-utilized
data source. In this paper, we provide a rigorous definition of
a metric product space on Windows Event Logs, providing an
embedding that allows for the application of established machine
learning and time-series analysis methods. We then demonstrate
the utility and flexibility of this embedding with multiple use-
cases on real data: (1) comparing known infected to new host log
streams for attack detection and forensics, (2) collapsing similar
streams of logs into semantically-meaningful groups (by user, by
role), thereby reducing the quantity of data but not the content,
(3) clustering logs as well as short sequences of logs to identify
and visualize user behaviors and background processes over time.
Overall, we provide a metric space framework for general host
logs and log sequences that respects semantic similarity and
facilitates a wide variety of data science analytics to these logs
without data-specific preparations for each.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, our research team has interacted with six security
operation centers (SOCs): touring centers, interviewing ana-
lysts to understand their work, data, and needs, and working
closely with operators for research and development projects.
Security operations now have widespread collection and query
capabilities for host-level data, and cyber operators continually
monitor the alerts, warnings, and other information reported
by the anti-virus (AV) and system logging capabilities of
each of the IPs in their network. While cyber operators
regularly manage these large quantities of time-series data,
most investigations and decisions require manual analysis, and
thus, much of the potential of these data-rich, information-
impoverished sources are not leveraged.
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One particular, readily available, but obtuse source of data
are host system logs. These detail an extensive array of events
on a host (e.g. file executions, user command prompts, socket
creations), information that is invaluable for cyber operations
tasks such as triage and forensics. A flexible log data structure
allows for encoding this broad range of information, but
the lack of uniformity and mixed data types are prohibitive
for data analysis. While powerful mathematics and resulting
algorithms for analysis of time-varying data exist, such al-
gorithms are often impotent in cyber applications, or require
time-consuming, data-specific preparations before application.
Therefore, there is a need for an embedding of logs into
a more manageable format while preserving semantics and
context. Such a representation would bridge the gap between
currently available streams of system logs and many mature,
tested algorithms for structured, sequential data.
A. Contributions
Our approach is to define a metric space on system logs,
which provides a computable distance for both single logs and
time-varying sequences of logs. The formulation is general
enough to be applied to diverse data streams with minimal
configuration. Furthermore, the distance helps to preserve
semantic similarity across logs/log streams, permitting more
automated and meaningful analytics; for example, softening
the brittle signature-based detection methods that currently
dominate malware file conviction technologies.
Armed with this distance measure, we open the door to a
number of existing machine learning and time-series analysis
methods which offer solutions to the three of the biggest issues
for SOCs: (1) a huge volume of data by facilitating dimension
reduction and clustering techniques; (2) finding unusual data
and spotting patterns via anomaly detection and correlations
methods; (3) incorporating context in which logs occur using
time-series analysis to view logs in their natural sequence.
By working with operators, we gained valuable insight that
contributed to this research: determining a priori which aspects
of the logs were most useful, learning what general patterns
operators seek and what these patterns indicate, verifying that
our embedding was still semantically meaningful to operators
(that is, their own intuition would not be lost when looking at
the transformed logs), and finally, designing some experiments
to show the utility of our proposed embedding, especially for
security analysts. The operators also provided us with a set of
Windows Event Logs (systems logs native to Windows OS)
from a number of different IPs, including streams of data
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collected during multiple instances of a ransomware attack
(CryptoWall 3.0).
In Sec. II we give details on Windows Event Logs, dis-
cussing some of the current uses and challenges with this data,
and in Sec. III we enumerate requirements for our metric space
and motivate our approach with a series of examples. In Sec.
IV, we rigorously define our metric space on host logs. We
first define a generalized metric space for log entries, providing
a quantifiable and meaningful similarity measure between
standardized log representations and permitting clustering,
dimension reduction, and other parametric machine learning
techniques. We further extend this metric to time-ordered
sequences of logs produced by a single IP, facilitating the
application time series analysis methods and allowing for the
incorporation of context through temporal aspects of the data.
In Sec. V we present preliminary experiments that exemplify
the utility and flexibility of our embedding—polymorphic
malware detection by comparing streams of data during an
attack to new ambient data, user IP and role classification
by grouping similar substreams, clustering logs to visualize
user activity per hour, and clustering short sequences of logs
to visualize a host’s logs throughout a day—followed by
conclusions, Sec. VI.
B. Related Works
To our knowledge no previous research work has attempted
to define a metric space for host log streams. There have
been some efforts to develop more systematic ways of using
Windows Event Logs to detect malicious events.
Anthony [1] details a number of strategies and provides
insight for hunting threats in Event Log data. He enumerates
several standard patterns that may indicate various stages
of compromise (i.e persistence, privilege escalation, lateral
movement, etc.), and suggests standard sets of filters to use
when hunting different types of threats.
Dwyer & Truta [2] propose an automated way of processing
and detecting anomalies in streams of Windows Event Logs.
They detail the process of filtering and ingesting logs into
SQL database, and introduce standard-deviation based alerting
system hinged on basic summary statistics.
Aharon et. al. [3] develop two novel methods for automated
processing and pattern recognition in semi-structured text-
based event logs: a sequential text clustering algorithm for
transforming logs into different event types, and the PARIS
(Principle Atom Recognition in Sets) algorithm to identify and
isolate co-occurring processes in a single data stream. They
implement these algorithms on real log data and then apply
the results to tasks such as characterizing system behavior and
efficiently searching and visualizing logs.
Berlin et. al. [4] build a set of features from Windows audit
logs and apply a linear classification model towards a robust
intrusion detection system. Testing their approach on a wide
range of malicious and benign software samples, they report
a 78% detection rate on malware missed by AVs.
Chen & Bridges [5] introduce a method to automatically
extract ransomware behavior from noisy system logs. The
technique ignores sequential context by building “bag-of-
words” features, that is, counts of events in a time-series of
logs. Taking input as log streams with and without malware,
the method extracts the features caused by malware. Using
WannaCry and variants they show the method is robust to
polymorphism that tricks 64/64 AV checked by VirusTotal
(www.virustotal.com).
A separate but related area of research known as “log
reduction” attempts to significantly decrease the number of
system audit logs without information loss in order to simplify
the process of forensic analysis, e.g., [6, 7].
II. EVENT LOG ANALYSIS: DATA & CHALLENGES
Developments in this paper progress on a private dataset of
real Windows Event logs donated to us from a cooperating
SOC. The logs are from 12 hosts, with contiguous captures
varying between one to eleven days. This test set is slightly
over 0.5GB comprising 88 IP-days for an average of about
6MB / IP / day. To put this in perspective, medium-sized
operations will collect similar host logs for approximately 10K
IPs continuously. Our operators have reported total host data
collection (across a variety of data sources) of 300MB to 10TB
per day depending on organization size and configurations of
what is collected.
Importantly, for our experiments, annotations found by man-
ual investigations of the operators were given, including the
role of the user (e.g., IT professional, administrative assistant)
and labeled attacks—four captures contain logs leading up
to and during an infection with CryptoWall 3.0, a prominent
ransomware from 2015 [8–10].
While we focus on Windows Event Logs, we note that our
formulation is sufficiently general to apply to a wide variety
of host logs.
A. Windows Event Logs & Limitations
Windows Event Logs are semi-structured records that detail
nearly all software and hardware related events that occur
on a Windows machine. They are generally comprised of
three types of logs: application, system, and security [11].
These events can be viewed in the native Event Viewer—see
Fig. 1 for an example log in the native interface—yet more
commonly SOCs configure hosts to filter a subset of the logs
and automatically forward them to a security information and
event management system (SIEM).
The non-relational data structure (e.g. XML, JSON) of the
event metadata permits flexibility in logs and facilitates easy
viewing and filtering by SOC operators. Hence, host logs are
a primary source used to trace attacks and find patterns. For
example, see our previous works [5, 12] describing manual
and automated processes for malware analysis through log
investigations. However, the often nested structure and non-
uniform keys / values are not well-suited to algorithms that
attempt to accomplish these same tasks in an automated way.
As a result, many of the analytic and alerting tools SOCs
have to analyze event logs provide only very basic statistics
and brittle rule-based detection. More complex analysis and
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Fig. 1: Windows Event Log Metadata viewed in Event Viewer Interface as
an XML. Photo credit Microsoft Technet Blog https://goo.gl/HC1enm
nuanced comparisons between logs are left to the discretion
of these domain experts.
One of the main impediments in applying computational
methods to event log data is the inability to automate these
types of nuanced comparisons. Currently, the only way to com-
pare logs or log attributes is by a simple binary classification
—either two logs/attributes are identical, or they are different.
This limitation reflected in the way that current tools operate
on logs, specifically: basic statistical analysis relies on the few
quantifiable aspects of these logs, e.g., number of logs with
a new Windows Explorer process created in the last hour;
querying involves grouping logs that share identical values for
the same key (which then takes them out of the chronological
context in which they occurred); rule-based detection is based
on a determination as to whether a new log’s attribute satisfy
a rigid heuristic, e.g., are the same as a previous log.
Overall, there is a need for a representation of host logs
that permits a semantically meaningful similarity measure that
is more flexible than a simple binary classification, and that
exploits the temporal aspects of the data, incorporating the
context in which the log appears.
III. METRIC SPACE REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we outline three requirements for our simi-
larity measure. For each, we provide motivation from specific
examples of host logs. We note that examples used in this
section are not contrived. They are anonymized real logs that
have undergone preprocessing that is part of our method (see
Sec. IV-A), specifically, nested logs are flattened, and only a
select subset of the the more-than-200 keys are shown. These
examples concisely illustrate our requirements, but do not fully
capture the sparse but high-dimensional nature of our data.
Requirement 1: Our first requirement is that each log can
be compared attribute-wise, and that our measure can encode
degrees of similarity that match the logs meanings. Shown
in Fig. 2 are two logs from different hosts during the initial
portion of the Cryptowall attack in which a temporary file is
installed with a random filename. While basic visual inspection
reveals that these logs are extremely similar, without such
a similarity metric, these logs would be considered strictly
different. The slight difference in these logs, namely the
randomized file name, exhibits Cryptowall’s polymorphism;
hence, not discriminating on this discrepancy is vital for
identifying the pattern Cryptowall leaves in logs (and the
perennial Achilles’ heel for signature-based detection). While
this is a particularly critical example, more common examples
are easy to contrive, e.g., two logs vary by only the timestamp,
IP, and directory from which a shell command is run—the
primary action, that the same command is run in both, should
be captured by the similarity score.
{ CmdLine: C:\Users\hostY\AppData\
Local\Temp\Low\8D6.tmp
CreatorProc: iexplore,
NewProc: C:\Users\hostY\AppData\
Local\Temp\Low\8D6.tmp
TokenElevation: 3 }
{ CmdLine: C:\Users\hostX\AppData\
Local\Temp\Low \4328. tmp
CreatorProc: iexplore,
NewProc: C:\Users\hostX\AppData\
Local\Temp\Low \4328. tmp
TokenElevation: 3 }
Fig. 2: Examples of two truncated logs from two different IPs during
Cryptowall 3.0 attack depicted, illustrating Requirement 1. While clearly
similar, without a semantic-preserving metric, the two logs will be considered
completely different. We note that .tmp files with random names exhibit the
polymorphism of Cryptowall 3.0.
Requirement 2: The second requirement for our embedding
is that it allows us to create an average representation of a
group of logs (e.g., the centroid of a cluster). Note that this
implies we can use distance to this mean to quantify how
similar a single log is to a group. We additionally require
that these average representations retain semantic meaning and
remain interpretable. Fig. 3 shows three new process logs with
the same new process (Windows Explorer), but that vary in
the creator process and the executable’s directory. The left and
center logs typify the normal (non-attack) Windows Explorer
process logs. These show a new Windows Explorer process
being launched by a startup process and a second Windows
Explorer process respectively (not uncommon). Yet, the third
shows that a temporary file named 4328 opened Windows Ex-
plorer—anomalous and seen during a Cryptotowall attack [8].
Ideally, our embedding would allow us to compute an average
over all logs with Windows Explorer as a new process (finding
a centroid between the observed creator processes), quantify
how much variation there is within these logs, and measure
the anomalousness of any given new Windows Explorer log.
{ CmdLine: C:\Windows\
explorer.exe
CreatorProc:
userinit,
FileDesc: Windows
Explorer,
NewProc:C:\Windows\
explorer.exe
TokenElevation: 3 }
{ CmdLine: C:\Windows\
Explorer.exe
CreatorProc:
explorer,
FileDesc: Windows
Explorer,
NewProc: C:\Windows\
explorer.exe
TokenElevation: 3 }
{ CreatorProc: 4328,
FileDesc: Windows
Explorer,
NewProc: C:\Windows\
SysWOW64\
explorer.exe
TokenElevation: 3 }
Fig. 3: Examples of three truncated logs depicted, each reporting Windows
Explorer is a new process spawned by a different creator process. Left, Center
logs are frequently seen in ambient data. Right log is only seen during Cryp-
towall 3.0 attack. These illustrate motivation for Requirement 2—a similarity
metric should allow a semantically-meaningful average representation, which
could be used in this case to identify that the rightmost log is anomalous
(unusually far from the average).
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Requirement 3: Finally, we wish our embedding to be able
to incorporate the context in which the log appears, both in
time and in sequence, as most distinct incidents occur over a
sequence, and cannot be fully understood from a single log.
Fig. 4 shows the attack vector log that is common to all of the
attack instances seen in our dataset—a Flash upgrade that was
presumably harboring the malware. However, this same log is
also seen in ambient data, presumably for legitimate Flash
upgrades. Hence, analyzing this log independently will not
yield important information, namely, that it precipitates every
sequence of events (e.g., anomalous logs discussed above)
leading to the encryption of files by Cryptowall. Consequently,
our metric should extend to quantify the similarity between
time ordered sequences of logs.
{ CmdLine: C:\Windows\system32\Macromed\Flash\
FlashUtil64_19_0_0_185_ActiveX.exe -Embedding
CreatorProc: svchost,
FileDesc: Adobe\u00ae Flash\u00ae Player Installer/Uninstaller 19.0
r0,
NewProc:C:\Windows\System32\Macromed\Flash\
FlashUtil64_19_0_0_185_ActiveX.exe
TokenElevation: 3 }
Fig. 4: Example of truncated log containing the attack vector of all Cryptowall
3.0 attack instances in our in our dataset is depicted. This log is also seen
in ambient data, so viewing it out of context is insufficient. This motivates
Requirement 3—a similarity measure between sequences of logs in order to
view the log in context.
IV. DEFINING A METRIC SPACE
Here we provide the metric space definitions and founda-
tions for logs and log streams. First we recall the definition
of a metric space.
Definition IV.1 (Metric Space). A metric space is a set X ,
with a metric d : X × X 7→ R, a function that maps every
pair of elements to a distance such that for all x, y, z ∈ X ,
the following properties are satisfied:
1. (Positivity) d(x, y) ≥ 0 and d(x, y) = 0⇐⇒ x = y
2. (Symmetry) d(x, y) = d(y, x)
3. (Triangle Inequality) d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z)
The rest of the section gives rigorous construction of the
metric space on logs. As a guide, we enumerate the process
as the following five steps.
1) Un-nest: Flatten nested fields in the raw logs.
2) Standardize records: Make all logs have a uniform set of
keys. Fix a subset of desired keys and their value types
(a schema). For each record, discard other keys, and if
necessary add the desired keys with a null value.
3) Define a metric per type: Define a metric di on each
value type (numerical, categorical, string).
4) Extend to a metric for records: Extend the component-
wise metrics to a distance between records using `2 norm.
5) Extend to a metric for sequences of records: Use `1 norm
on sequences of logs.
A. Defining Sets
To define the metric space, we first define our set X ,
by transforming the logs into a standard comparable repre-
sentation (steps (1) and (2)). To do so, we adopt database
terminology and methodology, transforming a non-relational
structure of nested keys and values (e.g. Fig. 1) into a uniform
relational structure (e.g. Fig. 2).
The first step is to simply un-nest the levels of keys and
values into a flattened list, appending a number to any keys
that result in a non-unique key.
Next, we chose a small subset of N keys (or attributes) that
we deem useful, and the appropriate domain (value type) for
the values of each key. Note that if a record does not have
any of the N keys in our subset, we discard it. We allow three
possible domains: numerical, string, or categorical, where a
categorical attribute with n possible categories is encoded
as a length n one-hot vector, a vector of all zeros except
at the index of the category it represents, denoted ei. With
this choice of attributes and domains we essentially define a
relation schema for our log data. Formally, let A1, A2, ..., AN
be the attribute names with the associated attribute domain
sets X1, X2, ..., XN . We define the relation schema R for our
data as R(T,A1 : X1, A2 : X,...AN : XN ), where T is time
(specifically, UNIX time i.e. seconds since 01/01/1970). We
define a log entry, x, as an n-tuple in our relation, that is,
x = (t, x1, ..., xN ) ∈ T ×X1 × ...×XN .
Additionally, since logs are comprised of a non-uniform set
of attributes, we must have a way of dealing with “missing”
data. If a log does not contain a particular attribute, we encode
it with the the special null element for that attribute type (see
Table I). Thus, we have now made our logs comparable by
reducing each to be represented by a uniform set of attributes,
as well as reducing the dimensionality and number of logs
of our data. Furthermore, formulating our metric space using
these general types allows us to apply the same procedure
regardless of the subset of attributes that we choose, making
our method both flexible and configurable.
Shown in Fig. 5 are two log entries in the following chosen
schema: Entry(Time: numerical, BaseFileName: categorical,
BaseFileExtn: categorical, CreatorProc: categorical, TokenEl-
evation: numerical, CmdLine: string). These are consecutive
log entries (30s apart) from the same IP during the beginning
of a Cryptowall attack. Note that these are the transformed
versions of the rightmost logs in Figures 2 and 3. In the log on
the right we added a null entry for the CmdLine attribute. Note
that we derived categorical BaseFileName and BaseFileExtn
attributes from the basename and extension of the NewProc
path. This example highlights another way in which this
method is highly configurable—by breaking attributes into
different domains, emphasis can be put on different aspects
of the data.
{ Time (Unix): 1446532736
BaseFileName: 4328,
BaseFileExtn: TMP,
CmdLine: "C:\Users\hostX\AppData
\Local\Temp\Low \4328. tmp"
CreatorProc: IEXPLORE,
TokenElevation: 3 }
{ Time (Unix): 1446532766,
BaseFileName: EXPLORER,
BaseFileExtn: EXE,
CmdLine: "",
CreatorProc: 4328,
TokenElevation: 3 }
Fig. 5: Consecutive log entries (30s apart) from the same IP with five chosen
attributes and time: categorical attributes are capitalized and string attributes
are shown with quotes. Left: transformed version of Fig. 2 (right). Right:
transformed version of Fig. 3 (right).
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TABLE I: Attribute Metric Space Definitions
Set element Metric Null element
Categorical1 ei ∈ RN+1 ‖
ei−ej‖1
2
e1 ∈ RN+1
Numerical xi ∈ R |xi−xj |xmax−xmin+1 0
String2 xi = string
2dlev(xi,xj)
|xi|+|xj |+dlev(xi,xj) “”
1 N = number of categories
2 dlev defined Eq. 1
Finally, we define a set for log streams, time-ordered
collections of log entries produced by a single IP. Formally,
we define a log stream x(t) as an ordered set of n log entries
with order induced by time: x : T 7→ X1 × ...×XN , denoted
x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xn(t)) with xj ∈ Xj . We assume the host
field is constant.
B. Defining Metrics
In this section, we tackle steps (3) define a metric for each
attribute type, (4) extend these to a metric on log entries, and
(5) extend this to a metric on log streams.
Step (3) Attribute Metric Space: We define the three general
metric spaces for each of the attribute types in Table I. We
define metrics di on each attribute type such that di : Xi ×
Xi 7→ [0, 1].
Categorical: We define the metric on categorical attributes
as the normalized `1 distance.
Numerical: We define the metric on numerical attributes as
the normalized absolute difference between two reals.
String: We define the metric on string attributes as a nor-
malized Levenshtein distance. The Generalized Levenshtein
Distance (GLD) is an edit distance which is defined as the
minimum cost of transforming string x1 into x2 where each
edit operations (insertion, deletion, replacement) is associated
with a particular cost. In our implementation, we weight each
of these edit operations equally with cost 1. We can therefore
define the GLD between two strings as:
dlev(x1, x2) = min {O(x1, x2)} (1)
where Ox1,x2 = O1O2....Ol is a sequence of l elemen-
tary edit operations used to transform x1 into x2. However,
dlev(x1, x2) ∈ [0,max {|x1|, |x2|}] is not a metric in [0,1] and
the obvious solution of dividing the result by the length of the
longer string results in a violation of the triangle inequality
IV.1. To solve this, we adopt a simple normalized GLD metric
proposed by Yujian et. al. [13]. See Table I.
Step (4) Log Metric Space: We define the metric between
two log entries, dentry : (×jXj)2 7→ [0,
√
N ], as the `2
difference of their attribute distances:
dentry(x
(1), x(2)) :=
√√√√ N∑
i=1
d2i (x
(1)
i , x
(2)
i ) (2)
It is a straightforward to show that dentry satisfies Def. IV.1.
Step (5) Stream Metric Space: We define the distance
dstream : {x(t) : T 7→ ×jXj}2 7→ [0, 1] between two streams
f(t), g(t) as the `1 distance
dstream(f(t), g(t)) :=
∫
t
dentry(f(t), g(t))dm(t).
If we consider f, g as a sequence of log entries (respecting
only the chronological order of logs), then f = (f1, ..., fn),
g = (g1, .., gn), with fi and gi as the ith log in their respective
streams, and m is defined as normalized counting measure.
Hence,
dstream(f, g) :=
∫ n
i=1
dentry(f(i), g(i))dm(i)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
dentry(f(i), g(i)) . (3)
On the other hand, if we wish to respect the specific
times of the entries in the log streams f, g, we a priori
have logs with different timestamps, f = (f(t0), ..., f(tn)),
g = (g(s0), ...g(sn)). A benefit of this metric space embed-
ding is that we can interpolate using convex combinations.
Specifically, if t0 < s < t1, then s = λt0+(1−λ)t1 for some
0 < λ < 1, and we define f(s) := λf(t1)+ (1−λ)f(t2). We
can then define the distance over f, g w.r.t time as:
dstream(f, g) :=
1
tn − t0
∑
dentry(f(ui), g(ui))
for a fixed interpolation of {u1, ..., uk} of the interval [t0, tn].
Note that for a discontinuous stream, f , dstream(f(t), f(t+
)) can be arbitrarily large. In practice one must take caution
to align streams in the time domain to use this distance. See
experiment in Sec. V-A where cross correlation is applied.
Altogether this may seem at first glance overly formal, it
has the advantage that the metric space calculations at all three
levels can be coded and applied to any set of logs for a schema
so long as the values are categorical, numerical, or string types.
C. Requirements Revisited
In Sec. III we enumerated requirements for a desired metric
on logs. Here, we evaluate our metric in terms of those
requirements, and calculate the pairwise distances between our
initial example logs provided in the requirements section.
We note that by definition, our metric space of logs, and
therefore streams, satisfies requirement (1), that the metric uses
attribute-wise distance measures designed to preserve semantic
similarity. As an example, using the attributes defined in the
schema above, the distances between the two logs shown in
Fig 2 is about 1.011. On the other hand, the distance between
the leftmost logs in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, which are much more
dissimilar, is about 1.866 (note that the maximum possible
distance for entries with five attributes is
√
5 ≈ 2.236).
Requirement (2), that we can compute averages / cluster
centers is more nuanced. Since numerical and categorical
attributes are embedded into a normed vector space, averages
/ centroids are straightforward—sums and scalar multiplica-
tion are well-defined and by definition these operations are
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respected by the norm. In short, if your schema (chosen set of
keys from step (2)) does not include strings Requirement (2) is
satisfied. For strings, there is no straightforward embedding to
a vector space that preserves similarity, so defining an actual
centroid is not straightforward. On the other hand, defining
the distance to a theoretical centroid gives a workaround.
Specifically, given a multiset of strings, S = {s1, ..., sk}, we
define the distance from a string s to the “centroid” of S as
the average of dstr(s, si). If we take the centroid of all of the
new windows explorer process logs seen in our dataset, and
compute the distance from this centroid for each of the logs
in Fig. 3, we get the distances (from left to right): 0.5, .625,
.875. These can be seen as a measure of how unusual each log
is, so using this metric, the malicious log is the most unusual.
Requirement (3) is that the metric takes into account the
sequence of logs, which is true by definition for the metric on
log streams. For an example, see Sec. V-A, where the sequence
of logs for an observed attack is used as a “soft signature” to
identify later polymorphic occurrences.
V. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
In this section we apply this approach to two datasets in
two experiments that exemplify the utility of defining a metric
space for Windows system logs. We emphasize that following
experiments are only possible due to the generalized embed-
ding we rigorously defined in IV. Because of the quantity of
data used, these experiments should be treated as example use
cases rather than well-tested experiments.
In all of our experiments we use the following schema
(sometimes dropping CmdLine): Entry(Time, BaseFileName:
categorical,BaseFileExtn: categorical, CreatorProc: categori-
cal, TokenElevation: numerical, CmdLine: string). These par-
ticular attributes are generally what characterize a New Process
Log, specifically, a log of type Security with the EventID
4688. So, in forming our set of log entries as described in
Sec. IV-A, and including only logs that contain at least one of
these attributes, we are essentially subsetting to include only
New Process logs, which makes up approximately 84% of our
data.
A. Pre-encryption Conviction of Polymorphic Ransomware
The goal of this experiment is to show how the metric
space permits organic creation of “soft signatures” to detect
ransomware from the usual log collection data. By “soft
signature” we mean a behavioral signature that provides a
continuous distance-driven score that in theory will detect
polymorphic samples.
Ransomware generally executes a sequence of events before
encrypting the users’ data, e.g. dropping files, unpacking itself,
deleting shadow copies of files in memory, beaconing to
a command and control server, exchanging encryption keys
[5]; hence, the goal for defense against ransomware is pre-
encryption conviction (aside from whitelists, firewalls, and
other standard security postures). We consider the following
scenario—when a first computer at an organization is infected
and encrypted by a novel ransomware, can the SOC create
Fig. 6: Representation of cross correlation between a test stream ftest, and
an observed sttack sequence fsig .
a polymorphicly-robust, pre-encryption detector simply from
the host logs collected (that is, without malware samples to
analyze)?
Data: For the experiment, we use actual logs containing
Cryptowall 3.0, a polymorphic ransomware. We take a se-
quence of logs during the attack and compare it to sequences
of logs from equal length segments of test data using the
log stream distance. This dataset consists of seven streams
from six different IPs collected in the same week. Four of
these are ‘attack streams’ from different IPs that contain a
Cryptowall 3.0 attack. In each of the instances, logs for leading
up to execution of Cryptowall appear, and the ambient logs are
mixed with the ransomware’s actions. In all cases the trojan is
eventually caught and quarantined by antivirus software before
encryption. The other three are ambient streams, one of which
is from the same IP (host 4) as an attack stream, but from the
previous day.
Experimental Design: We consider one attack stream as the
initial attack, and use only this to build a soft signature. First
we extract the observed attack sequence, denoted fsig , the
sequence of logs from the initial attack vector log to right
before the malware contacts the home server to request a
key for encryption. (This requires manual analysis of the log
stream to truncate it.) In each of the four instances of attacks
in our data the attack sequences, f (1)sig , ..., f
(4)
sig range from six
to seven log entries and the time intervals range from 36 to 44
seconds. It is worth noting that these signatures do not contain
any logs created by a malware or virus protection software, and
they occur before the encryption has begun. Additionally, the
attack sequences, {f (i)sig} differ not only due to the polymorphic
nature of the attack, but also due to the presence of ambient
logs unrelated to the malware.
Our proposed technique is to build an online detector,
comparing the attack sequence from the first infection, fsig , to
the recent log stream from a host, and if the distance between
the two streams are sufficiently close, alert. In practice (we
envision that) upon receipt of a new log, lk, the distance
from fsig to the previous nsig := |fsig| logs is computed,
dstream(fsig, [lk−n, ..., lk]) and compared to the previously
observed distances to determine if it is anomalously low—
indicating the most recent sequence of logs for that host is
similar to first attack sequence observed.
To test this hypothesis experimentally with our data, we use
cross-correlation to quantify the degree of similarity between
a fixed attack sequence fsig , and each of the log sequences in
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our data set.
While cross correlation usually refers to the displaced dot
product between two signals, here we use it to refer to the
displaced stream distance between two signals. Specifically,
with fixed fsig as above, and a test sequence ftest, we compute
the distance dk between each nsig-length sub-sequence of T
(Fig. 6):
dk :=Corr{fsig, ftest}[k]
=
nsig∑
i
dentry(fsig[i], ftest[i+ k]).
over each k = 0, ..., ntest − nsig displacement in the test
stream. Hence, we obtain a sequence of distances from ftest,
d1, ..., dl where l = ntest − nsig .
In order to build an online detector, we give an extreme
value score to each distance observation, dk, defined as the
probability of seeing a smaller distance. To compute this
probability, we use a p-value of a t-distribution, fit to the
observations we have seen up to that point, i.e., d1, . . . , dk.
We choose the t-distribution due to the small sample size.
By computing the extreme value scores in this way, we are
able to simulate how this measure could be used as a real time
/ online detector. We compute the test statistic for dk where the
parameters are estimated from the previously seen distances,
t∗k =
dk −Dk
sk
where Dk = {d1, ..., dk}, Dk is the sample mean of Dk, and
sk is the sample standard deviation of Dk. We then compute
the one sided p-value by calculating the tail probability of
each data point from the CDF of the t-distribution with k− 1
degrees of freedom, i.e., p-value(dk) = P(T < t∗k).
Results: The minimum p-values for each attack signature
against every full stream of logs is shown in Table II. Our
results indicate that the attack intervals are at least 11 orders
of magnitude closer to the generated signatures than ambient
intervals, where this minimum p-value for the attack streams
does in fact correspond to the attack interval. While this
extremely small distance is unremarkable when comparing the
attack signature to the stream from which was was extracted, it
is clear that a signature generated from a different attack also
produces an extremely low p-value. We recall that the four
occurrences of Cryptowall in our data experienced polymor-
phism, specifically, using different file names across samples.
Given the insufficient amount of attack data, we cannot say
with certainty whether this approach would lead to an accurate
detector, but these results indicate the merits of using this
metric for detecting malware events. If for example, we were
to create detector by setting a p-value threshold of 1E-15, and
test each signature against all the data streams (not including
the one it was drawn from). We get no false positives, and
detect the attack in an average of 40.24 seconds, directly
before the sample contacts the home server to request a key
for encryption.
TABLE II: Log stream for IPs 1-4 included a Cryptowall attack; IP 4 included a
day without an attack; IPs 5,6 had no attack. For each attack, the attack sequence
of logs, f (i)sig is slid across each full sequence of data to obtain a sequence
of stream distances. P-values from t-distribution used for determining if each
subsequence is extremely close to attack sequence. Minimum p-values reported.
Notice that sequences containing an attack have at least one subsequence that
is at least 11 orders of magnitude smaller than for non-attack sequences. This
shows that observing Cryptowall in a single log can create an accurate detector
for all other logs including polymorphic, identical, or no Cryptowall attacks.
IP f (1)sig f
(2)
sig f
(3)
sig f
(4)
sig
Attack
1 1.45E-25 4.23E-21 4.34E-21 9.70E-17
2 1.79E-21 5.19E-44 1.12E-34 3.44E-22
3 7.78E-24 6.49E-58 1.08E-82 1.62E-30
4 6.39E-21 1.83E-31 1.92E-31 1.94E-67
Non-Attack
4 4.87E-09 3.39E-09 3.51E-09 1.29E-05
5 1.79E-04 1.29E-03 1.30E-03 5.81E-04
6 1.95E-05 2.60E-05 2.81E-05 9.52E-05
This approach promises multiple improvements over state-
of-the art commercial AV software that was deployed on the
hosts in the experiment. First, it promises to identify the
ransomware long before it was actually detected by standard
AV software running on these hosts. As a comparison, the
software running on the hosts in our examples took between 1-
4.5 minutes to quarantine the ransomware—in two out of four
of the cases, our method detects more than four times faster.
Secondly, it promises detection that is robust to polymorphism
because it uses similarities across all chosen keys and across
time-varying sequences of logs (corresponding to malware
behaviors). Third, it does not require a sample of malware to
craft signatures; rather once an attack is identified, the attack
sequence from ambient logs theoretically be shared and used
for the detectors “soft signature”. Finally, manual analysis of
malware is not needed, although truncating the attack sequence
of the logs is needed.
B. IP Classification
The goal of this experiment was to validate the theory that
similar user activity clusters in the metric space we defined.
Following time-series analysis techniques in [14], we reduce
the dimensionality of the dataset using the log entry metric,
and then attempt to classify data streams by IP and user role,
as well as identify outlying streams that indicate a deviation
from a users’ normal behavior.
Data: We use log data from seven different IPs collected
over a period of five to ten days. These seven users fall into
three general roles: 3 administrators, 1 IT, and 3 researchers.
For the purposes of these experiments, we split the data from
each IP by day, and represent each ‘daily stream’ f as as a set
(i.e. f = {f1, ..., fn} is an unordered set of logs collected from
a single IP over the course of one day). In this case, we opt for
this simple structure that does not respect the chronological
nature of the data because we are interested in comparing
overall behavior, not in examining events. Additionally, in this
experiment we chose to not use the CmdLine attribute.
Experimental Design: We first take the centroid of each of
the 61 streams. Each centroid represents the average activity
for an IP over one day. We then compute the pairwise
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Fig. 7: Daily log streams by user IP and role, visualized using mMDS
dimensionality reduction technique. Streams from the same IP seem to form
dense clusters (with the exception of IP 6), and clusters from IPs with the
same user role seem to be closer together. Days in which a user did not
log in (illustrated with the smallest points) form particularly dense clusters.
Using K-Nearest-Neighbors, classifying by role yields perfect results, and
classifying by IP, we get very high scores with the exception of IP 6 (see
Table III).
distance between each stream using the log entry metric (Eq.
2), creating a 61 × 61 distance matrix. Using this distance
matrix, we: (1) use a dimensionalty reduction technique to
visualize the distance between streams, and (2) use a K-
Nearest-Neighbors (KNN) classifier to classify the streams in
terms of user IP and role.
In order to visualize the similarities of these streams, we use
metric Multi-Dimensional Scaling (mMDS) [15] to find a two
dimensional representation of the data. mMDS is a method
of finding a lower dimensional representation that preserves
the notion of similarity provided by a metric in a higher
dimensional space.
Results: We can see the results of the visualization using
mMDS in Fig. 7. It is clear that streams from the same IP
for the most part cluster quite densely, and that individual
administrators in particular tend to have similar activity across
different days. One exception to this appears to be IP 6,
which has two anomalous streams in the second quadrant, in
which they seemed to deviate from their normal daily activity.
We can also see that streams from IPs with the same user
role tend to cluster closely together. Even in the case of the
outlying streams for IP 6, these still cluster quite closely to
the streams of another researcher (IP 5), perhaps indicating
that these days were not out of character for a researcher in
general. Finally, we see that days in which there were few or
no log ins (i.e. stream is entirely background processes), tend
to cluster more densely slightly apart from other other higher
activity streams from the same IP, and are generally closer to
the fourth quadrant. This seems to indicate that this method is
at least partially picking up on desktop configurations rather
than user behavior. It is worth noting that although this is
TABLE III: Leave-One-Out Cross Validation F1 Scores for User IP Classi-
fication (KNN K = 3): KNN Classification yields high scores for all IPs
except for IP 6, which agrees with visual inspection of Fig. 7. This shows
that an IPs behavior across multiple days tends to be similar in our defined
metric space. Note that incorrect labels were misclassified as IPs from the
same user role, and classification by role yielded perfect results.
IP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F1-Score 0.952 1.0 .941 1.0 0.917 0.75 1.0
visualized in a two dimensional space, these observations are
still relevant in our higher dimensional representations. For
example, if we take the variance over each set of IP streams
using our log entry metric, we find that IP 3 has the lowest
variance (.0014), IP 6 has the highest variance (.071) and that
the rest range between .018 and .037, which tallies with our
visualization.
We now perform KNN classification using Leave-One-Out
Cross Validation (in which all streams for a particular IP are
held out when classifying user roles). Choosing K = 3 yielded
the highest accuracy. Classifying by user role, we obtain a
perfect classification, although we are unable to get results
for the IT role due to the fact that we only have an example
from one IP. When classifying by IP we obtain slightly worse
results, particularly for IP 6, and the resulting average F1
scores are shown in Table III. These very high scores illustrate
that this method is effective in classifying users by role, and
to a lesser extent, for classifying users by IP.
However, when we repeated the same procedure with
streams that contained no logins, and are therefore unrelated to
user behavior, we obtained only slightly worse results, leading
us to believe that much of what this method was picking up
on desktop configurations rather than user behavior.
This highlights one particularly problematic aspect of work-
ing with Event Log data, namely, logs that are produced by
background processes, and are not of interest in examining
user behavior, can vary significantly across IPs. If there are
disproportionately high number of background logs, this noise
tends to overshadow any distinction one could hope to see in
those produced by user-initiated activity.
Despite this finding, this method is still promising for
comparing streams produced by the same IP, and could be
used as a tool for pinpointing anomalous streams which might
warrant further investigation by an operations department,
e.g., hunting insider threats. For example, a simple anomaly
detector could be implemented by establishing a baseline
variance for each IP, and flagging any stream that deviates
more than a given number of standard deviations as suspicious.
C. Visualizing/Characterizing Daily Activity
This final experiment is focused on unsupervised ex-
ploratory visualizations that could potentially be used by a
SOC operator to get an overview of the daily activities of
the hosts on their network. As discussed above, a log stream
is generally dominated by background processes, and these
tend to wash out signals produced by user-initiated activity.
However, by applying clustering techniques, we can in fact use
the overwhelming volumes, consistency, and repetitive nature
of these background logs to our advantage. Specifically, we
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Fig. 8: Histograms depicting the daily
activity of each IP over the course of
five to ten days. Colors indicate cluster
label (i.e. of the ten days of data for
IP1, nine of 2AM-3AM windows fell
into the yellow cluster). Centroids show
that the yellow cluster is comprised of
a Microsoft background controller ser-
vice that is set to run several times a
day, and the (green) cluster is made
up mostly of Google Chrome back-
ground processes. These results support
the theory that much of the distinction
seen in Fig. 7 are due to background
processes: main background processes
are different for admins (IP1, IP3: pur-
ple), researchers (IP5-7: gray), and IT
(IP4: Brown). Additionally, it is clearer
why IP2 differs so significantly from
the other admins—the Microsoft pro-
cess occurs only once a day at 10AM.
perform two different methods of clustering to provide mean-
ingful dimension reduction to inform novel visualizations. In
the first, to understand hourly trends per IP, we use bagging
features of logs for each hour, an intermediate representation
between respecting the sequential relationship of logs (as in
Sec. V-A) and bagging features (neglecting chronology as in
Sec. V-B). In the second to understand sequences of events
for an IP, we respect the chronological occurrence of logs for
short sequences. These visualizations demonstrate how this
method could be used to decompose log streams from co-
occurring processes, identify recurring background processes,
and establish a baseline for a users daily activity.
Data: We use the same data collected from seven IPs
from three different roles as in Sec. V-B, and again omit the
CmdLine attribute.
Experimental Design (A): First, we demonstrate how our
metric facilitates the application of the k-means clusering
algorithm, and how this can quickly and easily be used to to
get an overview of the behavior of various IPs on a network.
We initially split each stream into hour-long segments, and
take the centroid of each substream, thus representing each
hour for each IP with a single aggregate log. We then bin each
IP-hour into k bins using k-means clustering with the log entry
metric (Eq. 2). We randomly choose initial “seed” centroids by
using a method similar to k-means++, in which the probability
of choosing each successive centroid is inversely proportional
to its distance to the closest existing seed. We select the
parameter k through the elbow method, plotting the within-
cluster sum of squares as a function of number of clusters
over k ∈ {2, ..., 10}. We find that the marginal decrease in
unexplained variance drops after k = 3 and again at k = 5,
and we choose k to be 5. The clusters represent the most
dominant processes for this group of IPs, and we can visualize
similar reoccurring processes across IPs.
Results (A): We show the results from the k-means clus-
tering of IP-hours in a histogram in Fig. 8. This shows the
frequency of each label seen for each IP over the five- to ten-
day collection period. Visualizing the data in this way allows
us to easily identify reoccurring processes across days and IPs.
For example, the process illustrated in yellow appears to occur
roughly four times a day for all of the IPs with the exception
of IP 2. By examining the centroid of this cluster, we find that
this is an Microsoft background controller service that runs
periodically and begins with a new ‘policyHost.exe’ process.
Comparing this to Fig. 7, it becomes apparent that much of
the distinction found between IPs and roles that was likely due
to background processes.
Experimental Design (B): Second, we show an alternative
method of clustering that leverages the sequential aspect of the
data. We split each stream into short, m-length sub-sequences,
compute the pairwise stream distance between each using the
sequence stream metric (Eq.3). We then perform DBSCAN
[16], a density-based clustering algorithm, to group similar sub
sequences into clusters and identify outlying sub-sequences.
Due to the high volume of background process logs, we hope
to label similar background events (clusters), and identify user
initiated processed (outliers). We used m = 7.
Note that in both of these experiments, since we have
designed our metric to preserve semantics, we can easily
understand the meaning of these clusters by computing and
examining cluster centroids. For the categorical attributes, the
vector can be interpreted as the percentage of each category
in the cluster (see bottom Fig. 9 showing examples of the
centroids of two Microsoft background process sequences).
Results (B)
The results for clustering m = 7 length sequences using
DBSCAN is shown for a particular daily stream for IP 3 in
Fig. 9. Each substream is depicted with a dot colored according
to cluster. Additionally, we compute the centroids of the set
of m = 7 logs that make up each sub sequence, and display
two examples of clustered background processes: Microsoft
.NET precompiling process initiated at login (left), and the
Microsoft ‘Policy Host’ sequence also seen in Fig. 8 (middle).
Unlike the first method, this can be used to extract user
initiated processed from a stream saturated with a high volume
of background process logs. The closeup in Fig. 9 shows
user-initiated sequences (labeled as outliers) interleaved with
background processes. We highlight and show the centroid
for a particular user-initiated sequence in which a PDF was
opened from Windows Explorer and viewed in Adobe Acrobat.
While these examples and visualizations are very basic, they
demonstrate the ways in which clustering can be easily applied
once we have a metric and how this could be implemented as
a tool for SOC operators to quickly sort and visualize large
volumes of data. Additionally, this latter clustering method
could potentially be used to extract an active user signal
from background process noise, and this could be used as
a preprocessing step for Sec. V-B.
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CreatorProc:
[NGENTASK: 0.86
NGEN: 0.14]
TokenElevation:
1.0
BaseFileName:
[NGEN: 0.86
MSCRSVW: 0.14]
BaseFileExtn:
[EXE : 1.0]
CreatorProc:
[POWERSHELL: 0.43
CSC: 0.29
WMIPRVSE: 0.29,
SERVICES: 0.14]
TokenElevation: 1.14
BaseFileName:
[CSC: 0.29
CVTRES: 0.29
CONHOST: 0.14
POLICYHOST: 0.14
POWERSHELL: 0.14]
BaseFileExtn:
[EXE : 1.0]
CreatorProc:
[ACROCEF: 0.29
ACROBAT: 0.29
ADOBE_LICUTIL: 0.14
EXPLORER: 0.14
SVCHOST: 0.14]
TokenElevation: 3.0
BaseFileName:
[ACROCEF: 0.43
ACROBAT: 0.14
ADOBE_LICUTIL: 0.14
CONHOST: 0.14
DLLHOST: 0.14]
BaseFileExtn:
[EXE : 1.0]
Fig. 9: Representation of a daily log stream for IP 3 with each seven-log
subsequence represented by a colored dot. Dots are plotted subsequence
number vs. time, where the color indicates the cluster classified by DBSCAN
(outliers illustrated in black). Top plot shows entire day with logged-in
period in bold colors (which is also notable by the decreased slope due
to a higher log density). Note the long login sequence shown in pink
which is comprised of Microsoft .NET Framework processes precompiling
assemblies over about two minutes. Middle plot shows a closeup of the
8AM-9AM window containing the end of the login sequence, followed by
a Microsoft Policy Host sequence (yellow). This sequence is interwoven with
other general (purple) and Chrome-related (green) background processes, as
well as outlying user-initiated processes (black). Examples of background
processes, as well as a user initiated Adobe related process sequence, are
highlighted, and their centroids are shown in the bottom figure. Note that these
colors have been chosen to show the correspondence between the clusters
found using this method and that in Fig 8.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we demonstrate the need for developing
a semantically meaningful similarity measure on Windows
Event Logs and illustrate the requirements and benefits of such
a measure using examples from real logs. We rigorously define
a metric space on log attributes, extend this to a metric on
log entries, and then to sequences of logs, and explain how
this metric space fulfills the requirements of our similarity
measure. We then demonstrate the utility and flexibility of
this embedding with three use cases: automated behavior-
based signature generation and detection for cyber attacks,
grouping hosts by software profiles, and exploring background
events. While our use cases are initial results, the results are
compelling and our goal is to show the efficacy of our metric
space for a variety of host-log analytic applications.
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